Feedback to FAIR PANEL
1) Introduction
The Financial Adviser Industry Review is timely and the five objectives outlined by MAS are apt and necessary, but in my opinion, a few more fundamental issues should be addressed as these would go to the root of the problems.
My feedback is partly based on my long years of running a brokerage and financial adviser firm, but more on fundamental principles of what the industry should be.
2) Shortcomings In Present Structure and Proposals for Improvement
The main points I like to make are:
a) The historical model of product providers themselves distributing their own products exclusively through tied agents is the mother of all problems working against consumers’ interest and national interest. The objective of reducing the multi-tiers in agency structure is just minor renovation and will not remove the fundamental conflict of interests presented by the tied-agency system.
b) The objective of identifying alternatives to the commission structure and especially the aim to achieve lower premiums for consumers must be examined very carefully as a wrong decision could set the industry back instead of helping it forward.
c) The Financial Advisory model deserves greater attention, especially the removal of the current confusing smorgasbord of Representatives – tied agents, licensed FAs, exempt FAs, non-independent FAs, Independent FAs. All should be Independent Financial Advisers and all Representatives should be with Independent Financial Advisers. If not now, at least in the next 10 years.
3) Financial Advisory Industry Structure
The present structure is characterised by:
Product providers (e.g. Life Insurance companies) also having tied agents to distribute their own products exclusively
This presents a direct conflict of interest between the product providers and the consumers since the tied agents can only sell the principal’s products and are rewarded (or punished) by their production and loyalty to the firm. The tied agency is an expensive system to maintain for the insurance company as it has to attract, train, incentivise and retain its tied agents. The multi-tiered structure has evolved over the years because of the need to compensate the agents to sell, and motivate managers to recruit and grow their groups. Marketing and advertising of products are warranted, but the tied agency system also spends huge amounts of money in advertising to give recognition to its agents in order to recruit and retain their agents. Monetary incentives and other forms of rewards such as incentive trips abound to keep and attract tied agents.
In the area of products, since it is their own tied agents who distribute their own products, different commissions are paid for different products to motivate agents to distribute the products which bring most profits. And insurance companies keep making their products more complex with many riders, perhaps, to make them difficult to unravel and compare with competitors’ products. Tied agencies also contribute to high cost for consumers as they have to spend time talking to agents of different companies to choose the best bargain. Time is taken up for both the agents and consumers. Since the products are often bundled and quite complex, consumers are often confused as they hear every agent extolling their own products and often not mentioning the demerits or uncompetitive features.
It does not help that insurance companies often impose quotas and targets on their agents which has led to over aggressive selling.
The tied agency structure is not only expensive for the insurance companies and consumers. It is costly for Singapore as it means that every insurance company is wont to recruit its own large force of agents to distribute its products. This large number of tied agents only pushing one company’s product wastes manpower (engineers and other graduates) and leads to wasteful duplication of training and marketing expenses.
It is estimated that Singapore can save at least half of the manpower now occupied with distributing financial products.
The savings in cost of maintaining multi-tiered tied agents can translate to lowering of premiums and better productivity.
A comparison of the earnings of the tied agency managers compared with that of the managers and owners of the Financial Adviser firms would clearly show that the tied agency managers are being paid much more for doing less work and bearing less responsibility. The Financial Adviser firms are basically paid the same overriding as the Managers in the Agencies, but have to defray all the costs of running their business (staff salaries, rentals etc.) Yet most have been able to survive and grow.
To recap, there are many things to be gained by not having tied agencies – for consumers, for the companies and the nation. The question is whether there is any alternative distribution channel?
Direct distributing has been cited to save on costs but if this is still done by the insurance companies, the basic conflict of interest is not avoided and the consumers are left without advice. At best, only the simplest of products can be distributed online, e.g. term and personal accident.
For term insurance, the best way is to give options for higher sums assured under the Dependants Protection Scheme.
Bank channel is an effective delivery system given the wide branch network and banking visits made by customers, but it would be better if banks have to register their distribution as Independent Financial Adviser so that they have to live up to the higher standard in giving “fair and objective” advice. Currently, banks are only slightly better than tied agencies and only distribute for a few insurance companies and are largely pushing flavour of the month products.
Financial Advisers (firms) are potentially the best suited to give advice and distribute financial products to clients. This channel avoids conflict of interest, and wasteful duplication and competition on the part of insurance companies for sales forces which should lead to cheaper premiums.
However, instead of the present scenario, having both licensed FA, exempt FAs and Independent FAs and non-independent FAs which is thoroughly confusing for customers, it is best to have only one type of FA, i.e. the Licensed Independent Financial Adviser. This means that every firm which wants to distribute financial products applies to MAS to be an Independent Financial Adviser and lives up to the high standards of fairness and objectivity and not just “reasonable standards.” Customers’ interest would be best served by IFAs. Banks, stockbroking firms and others who like to distribute financial products should set up IFAs.
All the tied agents would be housed in IFAs and customers would then be able to choose from among the IFAs who all have the right of distribution of all the insurance providers. Singapore would then have the distinction of being the first nation to solve the many problems now existing because of the conflict of interest and wasteful duplication.
4) Commission Structure and Alternatives
The present compensation structure is commissions and overriding commissions for all insurance products.
A few Representatives charge fees for financial planning and enjoy the commissions on the products also. One firm claims to be on fee only although not all commissions are rebated.
The financial planning which is done ranges from very basic planning (similar to what most Representatives provide and do not charge for it) to modular planning (e.g. retirement planning, estate planning) to comprehensive planning. Fees range from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars.
It is a given that financial planners would be more objective if they do not also provide the solutions and enjoy the product commissions. But to achieve this, we would need to have financial planning done by a separate group of financial planners who charge for fees and a separate group of Financial Adviser Representatives who recommend the products. This is difficult to achieve on a national scale. Whether the Representatives can charge fees for both planning and product solutions is the key issue. The difficulty lies in the perception of consumers. For consumers with complex financial problems and life planning issues to consult with financial planners and to pay fees for the consultation is not an issue. There are already many who are doing so. But to expect everyone who just needs to purchase one or a few products to pay fees would be difficult to achieve unless they are convinced that the premiums have been reduced fairly and they will soon forget this even if this is done initially. Otherwise the fees would be seen as an additional cost. Surveys would show that for consumers to pay for fees separately in addition to paying the premiums would be psychologically more difficult to stomach than to pay for premiums and let market forces operate to ensure they are competitive.
To have a system where Representatives would have to charge fees in place of receiving commissions from the sale of products would result in much unproductive time being spent explaining the fee structure and what consumers are getting for it. A Memorandum of Understanding or Agreement would have to be written and terms and writing the MOU and signing would require careful attention. If consumers shop around, and this is to be expected as the fees set by different companies and Representatives would vary greatly, much time would be spent by both consumers and Representatives. All the Representatives time would still have to be “paid” for and this will be priced into the fees which will eventually be paid by those who proceed.
A commission structure with its inherent product bias and adverse effect on objective advice, actually sees the rich subsidising the lower income since Representatives can make more on the bigger sales and still do not mind taking care of the smaller cases. A fee only system based on the type of advice given and fee negotiation would likely result in the lower income not being served.
Is there any other alternative besides fees?
Salary does not incentivise Representatives and is a fixed overhead which would make companies more selective but also initially and possibly always, more costly. If incentives are added, the system would impose quotas and targets (like what banks now do) and the Representatives are just as driven to make sales irrespective of customers’ needs. The present method of compensation whereby commissions are paid to Representatives and their managers via the premiums is actually an effective system provided the following changes are implemented:
a) Disclosure of commissions
b) Making it mandatory for Representatives to show to each client a term insurance quote if the product being considered is an endowment or whole life. This will alert consumers to the higher cover for term insurance at cheaper premiums. Consumers often still choose to purchase whole life or endowment even when shown the term insurance option.
c) Payment to managers can still be by overriding commissions but the multi-tier structure must be examined to see whether it adds to higher premiums. Most FAs have only two tiers (ie. Firm, Manager and Representative) and this is sufficient to take care of compliance and supervision needs. Salary for managers is an alternative but will add to initial and possibly overall cost of operations.
d) Commission rate for all products should not be too different. One way to reduce the discrepancy between life insurance products and investment products is to state separately the term insurance premiums and the premiums for savings and investment portion. This is done in some countries. This way, consumers can tell the difference between protection and savings. The commission for each portion can also be shown. It is likely that when this is done, consumers will opt for buying term and investing the difference in unit trust etc. Investment-linked policies are notorious for high commissions (compared with unit trust) and high charges, but are not transparent to consumers. The projection for 5 per cent and 9 per cent should also not be shown as it gives the impression that they are likely to be achieved. Follow the way of unit trust which does not show any fixed percentage. FAs hardly sell ILPs because of their knowledge that unit trusts have wider range of investment funds and lower charges.
e) All bundled products must clearly show what they comprise of. For example, term, annuity, whole life, endowment, critical illness. This way, the Representatives and consumers are able to understand the underlying products and costs. Packaging is an effective way to market products but it is essential to list the components of the package. It would be better if products can be simplified (like the ‘80s) but combination of different features is fine if consumers know what they are. Riders have also been added often without consumers understanding them and customers must be educated.
f) If tied agency is retained, it would be good to have an alert to consumers that they should consult an IFA if they wish to have product comparisons (this was done in the UK).
5) Financial Advisory Model
The objective of ensuring that Financial Advisers are strong financially (e.g. higher paid up capital) and are better managed (separation of duties between CEO and compliance and sales) and have dedicated Representativeresentatives (no other conflicting or distracting business or means of income) is good but the root problem is that in the present structure, they face several odds.
a) Confusion of who a Financial Adviser Representative is and how they differ from the agents
The common use of the term “Representative”, while neat and convenient for legislation, blurs the identity and legal position of the many persons who are now all called “Representatives”.
A Representative can be a tied agent with an insurance company, a sales person with an “Exempt Financial Adviser” like a bank, stockbroker, General Insurance broker etc. or a financial planner or sales person with a licensed Financial Adviser. To add to the confusion, a Financial Adviser is given the option to be “Independent” or not, but the public is often not aware of the difference.
Some FA firms which are not Independent have been alleged to receive additional incentive payments to produce more for certain insurance companies, thinking that they can do so just because they do not claim to be “Independent”.
The most important point is that consumers do not know the difference between all these “animals” and the multiplying of Job Titles adds to the confusion. The legal issue is that tied agents represent their principal (the insurance company) while the Financial Adviser represents the clients. When a legal issue arises, this point is important for consumers. Consumers would be best served and their interests protected if all involved in sales are the same, e.g. Independent Financial Adviser Representatives. If this is too drastic a change, it is still better if the legal terms “agent” and “broker” are used as these terms have been tested in court. The term Representative is too generic and blurs the important distinction between agents and brokers that should be known to consumers because it affects their legal rights.If the term “Representative” needs to be retained because it is also legislated, the term “Agent” and “Broker” should be used in name cards and other materials to alert consumers to the legal status of the sales person they are dealing with (this is still the practice in the general insurance industry).
b) Because life insurers have their own tied agencies, they are duty-bound to take better care of their agents and managers and support FAs with just the same overrides and little more. This means that FAs face a great financial challenge to survive. Without tied agencies, FAs insurers would be able to work out what is needful for FAs. Differentiation in compensation by different insurer may still exist but FAs would have to justify their recommendation. It would not be such a bad idea if the compensation can be similar like for the general insurance industry.
6) Conclusion
The FAIR Panel has the opportunity to make fundamental changes to improve the industry, but will certainly face resistance. My view is that with growing consumerism and consumers rising education and awareness of their rights and what is taking place in the developed countries, the industry must put in motion the necessary gears for change.
Ultimately, consumers must benefit in terms of price, service, advice and product benefits. The delivery system is the key issue and my contention is that it is best done by Independent Financial Advisers.
Not the model and size of the IFAs today but perhaps about 30 to 50 sizeable firms well-managed and with well-trained planners, consultants and brokers. A few may even be public-listed. They will likely be able to charge fees for financial planning.
The key question is how they will be compensated for products carried by the product providers such that they will still be fair and objective to consumers. Will it be by standardized commissions like for the general insurance industry? This is possible and the IFAs will compete on advice and service. Premiums and product features will be the areas of concentration for insurers to attract consumers. This will undoubtedly create healthy competition and improve product features and premiums which will benefit consumers.
The deconstructing of the tied-agency structure will be a major exercise but is achievable given the will and conviction. Bear in mind fund managers are using distributors already.
A disclaimer: It should be noted that I currently own and manage an IFA but my proposal will actually generate greater competition for our firm, not lesser. My interest is that consumers’ interests are put first.
Thank you.